2. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

82. To the arguments of this question [nn.1-3].

As to the first [n.1] it is plain the authority needs interpretation. For Augustine says there: “the image itself of it” (namely of Carthage) “in my memory is its word;” but it is clear, according to him On the Trinity XV ch.15 n.25, that the word is not formally in the memory; therefore it must be understood in a causal way and not a formal one.

83. To the second point [n.2]. Although there has been a lot of dispute about ‘vocal sound’, whether it is a sign of a thing or a concept, yet I concede in brief that what is signified properly by a vocal sound is a thing. However letter, vocal sound, and concept are ordered signs of the same signified thing, just as there are many ordered effects of the same cause none of which is cause of the other, as is plain about the sun illuminating many parts of the medium; and where there is such an order of caused things, apart from one being cause of the other, there is an immediacy of any effect with respect to the same cause, excluding anything else in the idea of cause but not excluding anything else in the idea of a more immediate effect. And then one could concede that in some way a nearer effect is cause of a remoter effect, not properly but because of the priority that exists between such effects in relation to the cause; thus one can concede about many ordered signs of the same signified thing that one of them is in some sense sign of the other (because it gives to understand it), for a remoter sign would not signify before a more immediate one in some way signified first, - and yet, for this reason, one is not properly sign of the other, just as is true on the other side about cause and things caused.

84. To the third [n.3] I concede that knowledge is offspring and truly generated, namely actual intellection, - but it is not an action in the genus of action (because, as said above d.3 nn.600-604, actual intellection is not action in the genus of action), but it is a quality of a nature to be the term of such an action, which is signified by what it is to ‘say’ and - in general - by what it is to ‘elicit’. A word, then, is not something produced by an action that is intellection, because the intellection itself is not productive of anything but is itself produced by an action that is in the genus of action, as was said above [ibid.]

3. To the Second Question

85. To the second question [n.5] I say that concrete and abstract per se signify the same thing, although in a different way of signifying, as son and filiation, - because just as filiation signifies a relation in the genus of relation, so does son (by way, however, of denominating the relative supposit), and if it is taken substantively [d.26 n.100] it signifies the same as such subsistent thing. Thus therefore word and the abstract of it signify the same thing: but its abstract - if it were named - would be ‘word-ness’, which indicates a relation formally (for it signifies the same as the passive expression of something of the intellect); but just as son connotes a living nature, in which there is such relation, so word connotes actual knowledge, of which it is such expression; therefore since in divine reality ‘to be intellectually expressed’ is the property of the second person, it follows that the word is there purely personal, and it signifies a personal property.

86. It is plain too that the reason for generating the word is not the Father as actually understanding, but the Father as perfect memory (namely as intellect possessing the actually intelligible object present to itself), as was made clear above in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Productions’ [nn.291-293, 221, 310].

87. It is plain also that the word does not have anything from which it is produced, from distinction 5 nn.80-82, - because if the productive principle have virtue sufficient for producing a per se subsistent, it produces such a subsistent, and especially if such subsistent is not of a nature to inhere in anything; but the expressed knowledge is not of a nature to inhere in anything,     therefore it is of a nature to subsist per se; and the productive principle of it possesses sufficient virtue, therefore etc     .

4. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

88. To the Arguments [nn.5-7].

When it is argued first from Augustine “the word goes with known love” [n.5], I say that his using the phrase ‘with love’ is a circumlocution for generated knowledge in us, because love does not have causality with respect to the word save as it commands its generation, as was said in the preceding question [n.81]. But in divine reality the word is knowledge naturally expressed, because the fact that the will has causality in us with respect to generating the word through its command is a mark of imperfection in our intellect; because it does not immediately have a perfect word; and as to how the will is disposed in God and in us, this was stated in distinction 6 nn.16-29.

89. To the other - from On the Trinity XV [n.6] - I concede that in the Father there is intelligence formally, but I deny the proposition that ‘every act of intelligence is formally a word’, because this is not true save of the intelligence that can have some generated act or generated knowledge; such an act cannot be had by the intelligence as it belongs to the Father, because the Father is form himself and has nothing by generation. Yet one can concede that the actual intellection of the Father is as it were generated by virtue of memory as it is in the Father, but it is not truly generated, because it is not distinct.

90. To the third [n.7] I say that they are not two properties but the same, because the son and word signify per se the same relation, although they connote something different (namely the son connotes living nature, in general, and the word connotes actually expressed knowledge [n.85]). These connotations are not always the same, but passive relation - when signified - is always the same.